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Political theology and religious pluralism: Rethinking liberalism in times of post-
secular emancipation 
 
Abstract Recent debates in liberal political theory have sought to come to terms 
with the post-secular condition, characterised by deep religious pluralism, the 
resurgence of right-wing populism, as well as new social movements for economic, 
ecological and racial justice. These forces represent competing claims on the public 
space and create challenges for the liberal model of state neutrality. To better grasp 
this problem, I argue for a more comprehensive engagement between liberalism and 
political theology, by which I understand a mode of theorising that reveals the 
theological basis of modern secular political concepts. In considering two contrasting 
approaches to political or public theology – Carl Schmitt’s and Jürgen Moltmann’s – I 
argue that liberal political theory can and should open itself to a diversity of social 
movements and ecological struggles that pluralise the political space in ways that 
unsettle the boundary between the secular and religious.  
 
Recent debates in liberal political theory have sought to come to terms with what 
Habermas (2008, 17-29) announced some time ago as the post-secular society. 
According to Habermas, post-secular societies had to take account of the ‘return of 
religion’ to the public space, a phenomenon that presented unique challenges to the 
liberal model of state neutrality, public reason and democratic will formation. 
Similarly, Rawls (2005) sought to accommodate deep religious pluralism within the 
liberal polity: rather than a simple modus vivendi between irreconcilable perspectives 
and sensibilities, he proposed the idea of an overlapping consensus between 
reasonable doctrines. Both thinkers recognised the need to move beyond a strictly 
secularist model that excluded religion from the public space. It was no longer 
expected, in other words, that religious people should leave their beliefs at the door 
when they entered the public sphere. Along with secularists, atheists and those with 
deeply held non-religious convictions, they had a right to political participation and 
democratic deliberation, as long as they were able to translate their views in terms 
that all reasonable and rational people, believers and non-believers alike, might 
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understand and agree to. However, this seemingly plausible solution to problem of 
religious pluralism threw up more questions than it answered, and subsequent 
debates in liberal political theory have wrestled with questions surrounding the 
meaning of state neutrality, the terms and limits of liberal tolerance, the extent to 
which religious differences and claims might be accommodated, and whether indeed 
the state has the sovereign right to determine these matters in the first place (see 
Laborde and Bardon 2017). 
Yet, what is generally absent in such debates, and what I believe might give us 
greater clarity on some of these issues, is an engagement with political theology.1 
This is perhaps not surprising given that ‘political theology’ is a somewhat 
polymorphous term, referring to a diverse range of debates about the relationship 
between the theological and the political. Political theology spans a whole series of 
discussions in political theory, continental philosophy and theology about the 
theological origins and underpinnings of modern political institutions, the role of 
theology in contemporary political discourse, arcane debates in twentieth century 
German legal theory and the philosophy of religion, historical studies of medieval 
and early modern conceptions of sovereignty, and investigations into the politico-
theological controversies in Christianity, Judaism and Islam, along with other 
religions.2 There is political theology done by theologians and religious scholars, and 
there is political theology done by political theorists – and often what seems like a 
resounding non--dialogue between them.3  
Notwithstanding the difficulties of definition, I contend that political theology has 
something important to say not only about the post-secular condition, but about 
question of religious pluralism in liberal societies. I understand political theology as a 
distinct mode of political theorising that draws attention to the way theological 
categories underpin and structure – in some ways explicitly, in other ways obliquely - 
the political institutions, discourses and norms of secular modernity. Taken in this 
sense, the question of whether we live in secular or post-secular societies is already 
answered by political theology: the post-secular is symptomatic of, and contingent 
upon, the secular and is therefore immanent within it – just as, one could say, the 
secular condition itself is premised upon the theological world it incorporated and 
replaced (see Löwith 1949; see also Milbank 1990; Asad 2003; Taylor 2007). 
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Therefore, to speak of the post-secular, or of the ‘return of religion’ to the public 
space, is to presuppose the secular; it is to make visible what was already integrated 
into the structures of modern secularism. Political theology, as a mode of analysis, 
makes this theological trace explicit and explores its implications for the way we think 
about politics today. It thus allows us to gain deeper insights into the controversy in 
liberal political thought regarding the tensions between religious claims on the public 
space and the idea, basic to liberal theory, of a secular state formally committed to 
religious neutrality and, indeed, to neutrality with regards to all competing 
perspectives on the good.  
However, one of the problems with political theology is that it is generally beholden 
to the thought of Carl Schmitt, whose sovereign-centric and absolutist model of 
politics is inhospitable to pluralism. In this paper I construct an alternative account of 
political theology to which pluralism is central. By pluralism, I understand more than 
simply a diversity of views, perspectives and identities that can be accommodated 
within a liberal political framework – although this is important too - but rather what 
political theorist William E. Connolly refers to as ‘deep pluralism’ (see 1995, 2005) 
defined by a generous ethos of engagement and respect between different 
perspectives and sensibilities, something that recognises the porosity and 
contingency of all identities. Here, it seems to me, a sufficiently pluralised – as 
opposed to orthodox or fundamentalist - religious sensibility might have an important 
role to play redefining political identities, institutions and discourses in ways that are 
neither entirely religious nor entirely secular (see Griffin 2005).  
However, I also argue that this renewal of pluralism in the post-secular age demands 
a rethinking of certain elements of liberalism. Here I draw on the thinking of 
Protestant theologian Jürgen Moltmann, whose alternative approach to political 
theology is resistant to state power and seeks an independent critical voice for the 
Church, one that is in solidarity with emancipatory social movements and liberation 
struggles, particularly around social and environmental justice. Moltmann’s version of 
political theology aligns with recent approaches in ‘public theology’ which advocate a 
more prominent role for churches and religious groups in progressive politics (see 
Moltmann 1999; see also Breitenberg 2003; Graham 2013; Kim and Day 2017). My 
claim here is that this more radical articulation of political theology not only contrasts 
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sharply with Schmitt’s conservative and sovereign-centric model, but also embodies 
a ‘deeper’ form of pluralism that goes beyond the limits of liberal theory, blurring the 
line between secular and non-secular modes of political experience. 
The argument presented here proceeds in four stages. Firstly, I set out the broad 
significance of a politico-theological analysis for liberal political theory, exploring the 
question of the religious determination of liberalism itself, and whether or not its 
theological origins undermine its formal commitments to religious neutrality. Rather, I 
contend that the real issue that arises from political theology is that of legitimacy, 
something that the liberal political order is currently experiencing an acute crisis of. 
The second part of the paper explores Carl Schmitt’s sovereign-centric version of 
political theology and his critique of liberalism and pluralism. Liberal political theory, I 
argue, cannot avoid an encounter with Schmitt; yet, at the same time, Schmitt’s 
thinking remains fundamentally hostile and antithetical to its core normative 
commitments. In the third section, I explore the diversity of more recent approaches 
to political theology which depart radically from Schmitt’s version and which are, I 
suggest, more compatible with liberalism, while at the same time pluralising the 
political field in ways that disturb the lines between the secular and religious. Here, 
radical political theology and eco-political theology are important examples of new 
ways of thinking about the entanglements of theology with secular and emancipatory 
political movements and struggles, particularly around climate change. In the final 
part of the paper, I focus on Jürgen Moltmann’s alternative account of political 
theology. In Moltmann’s support for human rights and federal political structures, 
there is much common ground to be had with liberalism. Yet, I also show how his 
‘intersectional’ understanding of rights – one that importantly takes into account the 
rights of nature – along with his idea that the church has a public role to play in 
resisting oppression, contributes towards a deepening of liberal pluralism in ways 
that better reflect the post-secular condition. 
Is liberalism a political religion? 
One of the questions that arises in any possible encounter between political theology 
and liberal political thought is whether liberalism is itself a religion, what we might call 
a political religion.4 In other words, does liberalism - as a political doctrine, a set of 
ideas, norms and institutional rationalities - take on the role of a secular or public 
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religion in contemporary societies? Do its early origins in the Protestant Reformation, 
in the religious conflicts of the sixteenth century, or in the early modern ideas of 
religious toleration, which were themselves grounded in theology, give it a kind of 
theological determination today? And if so, should this matter? Does it undermine 
liberalism’s claims to neutrality and public reason, or its normative commitments to 
equality and individual rights? The suggestion here is not that the theological roots of 
modern liberalism mean that it remains somehow a distinctly Christian, even 
Protestant, doctrine blind to its own biases and structurally intolerant towards other 
religious viewpoints and discourses (see Asad 2003; and Mahmood 2005). Here I 
think liberals can defend themselves against the critique that liberalism privileges 
certain religions and belief-based religious life over those (non-Christian) religions 
grounded in tradition and embedded practices and rituals (see Laborde 2017, 32-36; 
and 2008). 
Instead, a politico-theological analysis of liberal state neutrality throws up a 
somewhat different set of issues and concerns about the way that the modern state 
takes on a sacred dimension once occupied by religious authority prior to the 
collapse of the theological world in the sixteenth century. Of course, we must 
distinguish here between the theological and the sacred: Christian theology was, and 
continues to be, at times at odds with the religious (and political) authority of the 
church and with religious practices and institutions that are deemed sacred. Yet my 
point is that the emergence of secularism and ideas of religious toleration in 
modernity is really the story of the absorption and integration of religious authority 
within the structures of the sovereign state. The sovereign state takes over from the 
church as the sacred body – the corpus mysticum - which gives shape and symbolic 
consistency to society. One can see this logic of absorption quite clearly in Hobbes 
when he refers to Leviathan as the ‘mortal God’ and when he attributes to the 
secular sovereign the ultimate right to determine religious controversies, while at the 
same time allowing a certain private freedom of faith. Of course, liberalism as an 
ideology seeks to regulate and limit sovereign power, and the ambiguous 
relationship between liberalism and sovereignty, as we shall see below, becomes 
one of the central questions for political theology to deal with (see Kahn 2011). 
However, in modernity, in Western societies at least, liberalism has become a 
political culture (see Schmitt 2007) and secular governing rationality through which 
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this sacred power of sovereignty is articulated. Its defining norms and principles, 
such as the rule of law, formal equality and respect for individual rights, become as 
much the legitimating discourses of sovereign state power as they impose limitations 
upon it. So when the liberal state seeks to mediate religious conflicts, when it 
decides on matters of religious freedom, toleration and accommodation, when, in 
short, it determines the boundaries of the secular public space, it does so with a 
symbolic authority that has its foundations in theology and which continues to bear 
its legacy and imprint. A politico-theological reading of the liberal state is a way of 
thinking about its legitimacy in secular modernity; of what gives it the legitimate 
authority to determine the appropriate boundaries between religion and the public 
space. 
Now, one might wonder why any of this matters, why the theological genealogy of 
the modern liberal state necessarily problematises liberalism as a philosophy. 
However, if, as I have suggested, we understand political theology as being 
concerned with the question of political legitimacy, then we are left with a real 
problem today: contemporary liberalism is experiencing its own crisis of legitimation. 
Here I am referring not only to increasingly intense conflicts between different faiths, 
or to the increasingly contested boundaries of the secular public space. We could 
also point to the populist challenge to liberal norms and principles such as 
egalitarianism, individual rights, the rule of law, and religious neutrality. Populists, at 
least those of the right-wing, nationalist, identitarian stripe, adopt an exclusionary 
view of citizenship and access to the public space based on a narrow conception of 
the nation, often defined in terms of a certain ethno-cultural-religious (Christian) 
identity that they see as threatened by immigration and multiculturalism. Religious 
conflict and the populist challenge represent different aspects of the crisis of 
legitimacy that liberal politics is currently undergoing. Moreover, they might be seen 
as expressions of a form of political theology in the sense that they revolve around 
the problem of sovereignty and what it means today: should the secular state 
become a theocratic state, should it derive its authority more explicitly from religious 
sources, as, for instance, Christian fundamentalists in the United States would 
argue; should the secular state be more explicitly aligned to national identity and 
interests, which are placed above international obligations; should sovereignty, 
highjacked by liberal elites and global interests, be restored to the people and 
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become the direct expression of its will, as populists demand?5 Here democratic 
sovereignty and legitimacy take on an entirely different meaning to that proposed by 
liberal constitutionalists and deliberative proceduralists. Indeed, what we seem to be 
witnessing today is the coming apart of liberalism and sovereignty, and the 
emergence of a new, authoritarian ‘post-liberal’ political paradigm which presents 
serious challenges to liberalism. Thinking about these challenges through the prism 
of political theology can give us greater insight into their origins, as well guide a 
response. 
Carl Schmitt’s challenge to liberalism 
Of course, any discussion of political theology and its implications for liberal political 
theory cannot avoid an encounter with Carl Schmitt, the conservative German 
Weimar era legal theorist and later Nazi jurist with whom, at least in modern debates, 
the term political theology is inevitably associated. In his 1922 work, Politische 
Theologie, Schmitt makes two key points about sovereignty. The first can be 
summed up in the oft-quoted line, ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ 
(Schmitt 2005, 5). For Schmitt, the defining feature of sovereignty, what is really at 
its core, is the unilateral authority to decide on exceptional situations, on what we 
might call ‘states of emergency’. Here the sovereign has the ultimate authority to 
decide not only what measures to take – up to and including suspending the normal 
legal order – but what actually constitutes an exceptional situation, that is, an 
existential threat to the state, in the first place. This ‘exceptional’ authority of 
sovereignty is in a paradoxical relationship to the juridical norms that define the legal 
order: in suspending the rule of law, the moment of the exception exceeds the legal 
norm, but it is also what, in the ‘last instance’, grounds and secures these legal 
norms and gives them their authority. This idea of the exception is part of Schmitt’s 
critique of liberal constitutionalism and of neo-Kantian legal theorists like Hans 
Kelsen, who sought to rule out the exception in jurisprudence by understanding law 
as a self-contained, self-referential series of norms with nothing outside it. In a 
similar way, liberal political theorists would seek to rule out the exceptional decision 
through procedural norms and constitutional principles designed to limit and regulate 
political power. However, for Schmitt, the problem with these approaches was that 
they failed to recognise that legal norms and rules actually presuppose an exterior 
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authority that determines when and how a rule is applied in specific situations, thus 
giving concrete expression to the rule through its transgression. Schmitt therefore 
asserts the pre-eminence and superiority of the exception over the rule (2005, 15). It 
is difficult to see this in any other terms than as a juridical defence of the principle of 
sovereign absolutism that can violate the rule of law in the very name of upholding it. 
The second key aspect of Schmitt’s argument about political theology is as follows: 
‘All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological 
concepts…’ (2005, 36). This is Schmitt’s take on secularism: modern political concepts, 
such as state sovereignty and the aforementioned state of exception, are really a secular 
translation of theological concepts. There is a structural parallel between the absolute 
authority of God over the universe and the absolute authority of the sovereign over society; 
and the state of exception – in which the legal constitution is suspended by the sovereign’s 
decision – is similar to God’s miracle that suspends the laws of nature. In pointing to these 
structural analogies, Schmitt is not so much reflecting on the persistence of religion in 
politics but, rather, highlighting a place of transcendence left vacant by religion in the modern 
era. Thus, state sovereignty comes to fill the void once occupied by religious authority 
(Newman 2019). 
However, Schmitt is doing more here than simply revealing the theological 
underpinnings of modern secular politics. He is once again defending the principle of 
absolute sovereignty, which he believes should exist in a transcendent relationship 
to society, just as God transcended the natural order. The problem was that in 
modernity, under the combined pressures of secularism, atheism, technology, 
bourgeois economics, philosophies of immanence and, above all, liberalism, this 
necessarily transcendent, sacred dimension of sovereignty had been eclipsed. The 
state had been turned into an ‘administrative machine’ entirely at the service of the 
economy and subordinate to the liberal preoccupation with ‘culture’, parliamentary 
procedure and the rule of law. The modern secular liberal age was therefore the age 
of political neutralisation (Schmitt 2007, 80-96). It is hard not to hear echoes of this 
critique in the contemporary populist attack on the liberal ‘administrative’ state. 
Indeed, Schmitt’s political theology can be seen as a response to an earlier 
legitimation crisis of the Weimar liberal state. 
For Schmitt, liberalism is an anti-politics in which the sanctity of the sovereign 
decision is drowned out by rules, laws, procedures and interminable debate and 
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deliberation. Liberal institutions, in Schmitt’s eyes, were nothing but debating 
chambers in which the decision is endlessly deferred. Moreover, in denying what 
Schmitt saw as the basic anthropological (and we could say theological) truth of any 
genuine political theory – the inherent evil of man – liberalism could not be 
considered as political at all. Rather, according to Schmitt (2007, 71) it was a set of 
ethical norms, a culture of individualism and a theory of economics. 
Liberalism, for Schmitt, is therefore an evasion of the political. It avoids what is 
central to the political dimension - the relationship of enmity that allows a political 
identity or community to be constituted in opposition to the other who is seen to pose 
an existential threat to it. For Schmitt, the friend/enemy opposition is at the heart of 
the political relationship: the intensity of this opposition is what raises all relationships 
in society to the ‘dignity’ of the political. Indeed, it is the possibility that one might go 
to war with the other, that one might be prepared to kill one’s enemy, that turns the 
normal differences and oppositions one finds in society into genuinely political 
relationships. According to Schmitt, liberalism seeks to avoid this reality by 
sublimating enmity into either economic competition, or into disagreements that can 
be resolved rationally through debate and dialogue and without violence.  
The idea of enmity is a useful way of testing liberalism’s capacity to recognise and 
negotiate religious differences. Under normal circumstances, and indeed when 
viewed from the perspective of liberalism, religion is non-political: it is a matter of 
private belief and consigned to the realm of civil society as opposed to the public 
realm of the state. Liberalism, with its neutral institutions and principles of toleration, 
does its best to depoliticise and privatise religion. However, when these structures 
break down, when religious conflicts intensify, they go from being religious to political 
conflicts (Schmitt 2007, 37). Schmitt is drawing attention to what he sees as the 
inevitable dimension of conflict and opposition through which all communities, 
including religious communities, are constituted. Moreover, when the state seeks to 
mediate religious differences, to eliminate the threat of religious conflict, it can only 
do so by transcending society and establishing an absolute and decisive sovereignty 
over it. Yet, behind this image of secular state neutrality is a theologically charged 
political community, unified through a shared enmity towards the other, the outsider, 
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as well as through absolute loyalty and obedience to the sovereign (see Meier 1998, 
76).   
What Schmitt’s political theology is really averse to is pluralism. The sovereign state 
must be the single, transcendent authority in society, the unilateral decider of the 
borders and boundaries of the political community. Schmitt is therefore critical not 
only of liberalism’s acceptance of, indeed commitment to, a certain pluralism of 
views and perspectives in society, but also of pluralist theories of the state, which 
see the state as one association amongst many in society and as having no greater 
claim on our loyalty than other associations we may belong to. While this particular 
understanding of pluralism is a matter of some controversy in liberal political theory - 
particularly on the question of whether the liberal commitment to state neutrality 
means the state has no legitimate jurisdiction over different religious communities6 – 
the recognition of different and, at times, competing claims to our allegiance and 
sense of belonging and identity, whether religious, cultural or whatever, is an 
important aspect of contemporary liberal theory. Here Schmitt turns his attention to 
English pluralists and liberal socialists like Harold Laski and G.D.H Cole, who 
pointed to the way that the individual in modern societies lived simultaneously in 
different worlds, being members of multiple associations and groups at any one time, 
whether they be a church, labour union, family or sports club. When there was a 
conflict of loyalties between these groups, the situation could only be decided on a 
case by case basis. In Schmitt’s eyes, this view of social relations represented an 
unacceptable challenge to the sovereignty of the state, which should claim our 
ultimate loyalty, above and beyond the other associations we may be part of. But, 
more so, this form of state pluralism represented a disavowal of the political, 
according to Schmitt: once again, it evades the question of who ultimately decides 
on conflicts between different associations. Political theology, at least on Schmitt’s 
reading, means not that the religious but the political is a special case, that it has a 
special status compared to other spheres in society and that, as such, it has a 
unique claim on our loyalty. It is therefore incompatible with pluralism (Schmitt 2007, 
45). 
I have explored the main dimensions of Schmitt’s political theology and its 
implications for liberalism. In understanding political theology as the secularisation of 
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the theological into political terms, Schmitt sought to create a new kind of political 
religion of absolute state sovereignty, one that was fundamentally hostile to 
liberalism. What should liberals take from Schmitt’s thesis? Is there anything here 
that could redeemed and usefully deployed by liberals in addressing the problem of 
religious pluralism in post-secular societies? While Schmitt’s political theology might 
be a good diagnostic tool for revealing the theological behind the secular, it carries 
with it the baggage of authoritarianism and absolutism – one could say a kind of 
political monotheism (see Gourgouris 2016) – that is irreconcilable with liberalism’s 
commitment to toleration and the recognition of pluralism, to say nothing of its other 
commitments to individual rights and constitutionalism. If liberalism seeks legitimacy, 
it is difficult to say why Schmitt’s authoritarian notion of the sovereign decision, or his 
politics of enmity, offers a more appealing or effective ground than public reason and 
deliberation. 
This notwithstanding, my view here is that liberal political theory cannot simply shut 
itself off from the questions raised by political theology. It must take account of the 
inextricable relationship between theology and politics that characterises secular and 
post-secular societies. Moreover, liberal theory can draw on theological modes of 
thinking about politics as a way of responding to some of the challenges it faces. My 
aim here is to not develop a distinct liberal political theology, but to show how an 
alternative rendering of political theology can yield conceptual resources that are 
more compatible with liberal norms and principles, and thus contribute towards a 
new framework of political legitimacy in a post-secular age. 
Pluralising political theology 
We should bear in mind that Schmitt’s version of political theology, while influential, 
especially in contemporary reflections on the limitations of liberalism (see Kahn 
2011; Mouffe 2009) is, at same time, highly singular and contested. Even in 
Schmitt’s time, debates in German intellectual circles in the fields of political 
philosophy (see Strauss 2007), the history and philosophy of religion (see 
Blumenberg 1985), and theology cast major doubt on the coherence of his political 
theology. Perhaps most significantly, the theologian Erik Peterson (2011) questioned 
the theological basis for Schmitt’s monotheistic account of sovereignty, arguing that 
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it was incompatible with the Christian Trinitarian doctrine, accusing Schmitt of a kind 
of political paganism.  
More recently, as the field of political theology has become broader and more 
diversified, new and more emancipatory approaches have emerged, building on 
radical theological movements in the 1960s and 1970s, such as ‘liberation theology’ 
(see Metz 1998; and Gutiérrez 1998). These approaches have sought to rethink 
Christian theology to bring it into line with the increasingly secular orientation of 
Western societies. Indeed, continental philosopher Gianni Vattimo has argued that 
the destiny of Christianity is secularism, and that once it has been stripped of 
doctrinal orthodoxy and its reliance on church authority, what is left of Christianity is 
its message of love, charity and tolerance. God thus performs his own kenosis, 
emptying himself of his sovereignty and leaving the world entirely to us to determine. 
In this account, the secularisation of Christian theology leads to very different 
conclusions to those drawn by Schmitt: rather than providing the basis for a new 
system of order and authority, it gives rise to radical forms of freedom and 
ontological contingency characteristic of the postmodern condition (Vattimo 2007, 
27-47). Rather than establishing a new kind of social unity and homogeneity, as 
Schmitt had hoped, Christianity, in its secularised form, leads to a greater awareness 
of pluralism, and therefore to a greater sense of personal liberation and the freedom 
to interpret one’s life as one chooses. While Vattimo would no doubt reject the 
association, we could say that his notion of radical hermeneutic freedom, which he 
sees as the ultimate destiny of Christianity, fits in with a certain vision of liberal 
pluralism.7 Richard Rorty’s (1989) earlier commitments to a non-foundationalist 
liberalism come to mind here.8  
The field of political theology is also being diversified from a different direction, 
through an engagement with other religious traditions like Islam and Judaism. As 
Andrew F. March (2013) shows, while Islamic political theology is largely concerned 
with sovereignty and its legitimation, there are tendencies within this broad tradition – 
for instance, tensions between religious law and political power – which can give rise 
to more democratic forms of politics, as has been witnessed in the revolts of the 
Arab Spring. Within Judaism, an absolutely monotheistic religion, there is 
nevertheless scope for alternative and more pluralistic political theologies, ones that 
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are more compatible with secular liberalism, as could be found in the philosophy of 
Spinoza (see Strauss 1982), Moses Mendelssohn and Hermann Cohen (see 
Rashkover and Kavka 2013); not to mention the more mystical and messianic 
traditions of Jewish philosophy – Rosenzweig, Buber, Scholem, Landauer and 
Benjamin – which go well beyond the conceptual limits of liberalism, and which 
destabilise the foundations of nation state sovereignty, often taking political theology 
in more radical, even anarchic, directions (see Rosenstock 2010; Martel 2012; Löwy 
2017). 
These interventions suggest we take a broader view of political theology, one that is 
no longer bound to the conservative Schmittian version discussed above, and which 
can inform contemporary social movements and emancipatory forms politics, such 
as Occupy and Black Lives Matter (see Miller 2019). The interpretation of political 
theology here is entirely opposed to Schmitt’s sovereign-centric model, emphasising 
instead a theology of immanence that is reflective of horizontal, decentralised and 
radically democratic forms of politics (see Robbins 2011). It also presents, I would 
argue, important challenges to the liberal democratic model of the state and to 
conventional ideas of political representation and civic engagement.  
Of particular interest here is ecological political theology, which builds on continental 
philosophy (see Bennett 2009) and ‘process theology’ (see Cobb and Griffin 1979; 
Whitehead 1979) in order to respond to the implications of the Anthropocene age 
and the environmental crisis. In emphasising our immanent connectedness and 
entanglement with natural and non-human worlds, it often presents a pantheistic 
political theology that departs not only from Schmitt’s anthropomorphic and 
transcendent way of thinking (see Keller 2015) but also goes beyond accepted 
liberal categories of agency and individuality. Central here is the increasing 
awareness, brought on by the looming environmental crisis, of the common world we 
share with nature and with non-human life forms, such that we can no longer think of 
ourselves as autonomous individuals ontologically separated from these ecosystems 
(see Keller and Rubenstein 2017). This is a realisation that can inspire new forms of 
interspecies cooperation, and indeed new conceptions of political community (see 
Latour 2017).  
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While these alternative political theologies do not fit easily within the categories of 
liberal political philosophy, they have a broader significance in showing how the 
contemporary political terrain is being pluralised, not only by different religions with 
their claim to the public space, but also by new secular social movements and 
ecological sensibilities that have an unmistakably theological character. For instance, 
climate justice movements such as Extinction Rebellion would seem to be modern-
day secular forms of millenarianism, for which the imaginary of the Apocalypse and 
the ‘end of times’ narrative is the main mobilising force. Moreover, faith-based 
communities and organisations are often present at climate change demonstrations, 
and they usually involve prayer and other religious rituals. Contemporary ecological 
activism more generally aims at the re-enchantment of the secular political space 
through the encounter with nature and the non-human world, something that can 
lead to a multi-religious pluralisation of political theology (see Kidwell 2019). I would 
argue that these movements also necessitate a pluralisation of liberal political theory 
itself by expanding the definition of religion to the ‘non-religious’ and, in general, 
heightening our awareness of the growing porosity of the secular public space. If the 
line between theology and politics appears increasingly indistinct today – if secular 
political movements come to resemble religious movements and if religious groups 
and communities are prepared to engage in public dissent and protest – then we 
need to think about how this alters the terms of liberal political discourse.  
Moltmann’s public theology 
In exploring this question, I would like to focus on the thought of the Protestant 
theologian Jürgen Moltmann. In the 1960s Moltmann developed a form of 
eschatological Christian theology based on the idea of hope embodied in Christ’s 
resurrection - one that was, at the same time, strongly influenced by critical social 
theory and theologies of liberation (Moltmann 1967). Moltmann’s interest in liberation 
struggles follows a long theological tradition of engagement with political issues and 
social justice causes – from Social Gospel in the US, to the liberation theology of 
Metz, Gutiérrez and Sölle, to prominent theologians like the dissident Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, as well as Reinhold Niebuhr and Max Stackhouse.9 What makes 
Moltmann particularly relevant here is that he develops a distinct political or public 
theology radically opposed to that of Schmitt, and which, in its defence of human 
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rights and constitutionalism, has a strong attraction for liberalism. On the other hand, 
Moltmann’s political theology, in its call for the de-privatisation of Christianity, for it to 
play a more prominent and critical role in public life, goes beyond the liberal model of 
the strictly secular public sphere and allows us to rethink its conceptual boundaries 
in ways that can, at the same time, rejuvenate liberal politics and provide it with new 
grounds for legitimacy. My claim here is that Moltmann’s political theology deepens 
liberalism’s commitment to pluralism, not only in showing that religion can engage 
more openly in politics without undermining the idea of the formally neutral, secular 
public space, but also in scrambling the normative codes of liberal politics by making 
the struggles for ecological and social justice a core part of its discourse. Central to 
Moltmann’s political theology is the role of organised religion in the critique of power, 
even of its own power, and it is this guiding ethos that I see as key to a new kind of 
resistant political pluralism. 
To make sense of this, it is necessary to see how Moltmann’s political theology 
contrasts with Schmitt’s. Indeed, in Moltmann’s eyes, Schmitt’s sovereign-centric 
political thinking is not really a political theology at all, in the sense that it has nothing 
to do with any genuine Christian theology. Rather, it is a political religion, that is, a 
religion of power, a way of justifying, using the garb of theology, an absolutist 
sovereign state.10 Just as Hobbes invented a new religion of the state, personified in 
the figure of Leviathan, Schmitt formulates a political religion based, as we have 
seen, on the translation of theological into political concepts. Yet, according to 
Moltmann, in the wake of Auschwitz and the failures of the totalitarian state, a new 
kind of political theology developed, based on renewing the vocation of the church as 
a critical political voice in society:  
The determining subject of the new political theology, however, is Christian 
existence in its difference from general civil existence, and the church in its 
difference from society and state. So the aim of the new political theology is to 
strip the magic from political and civil religion, and to subject to criticism the 
state ideologies which are supposed to create unity at the cost of liberty. In 
this way it places itself in the history of the impact of Christianity on politics, 
which means the desacralization of the state, the relativization of forms of 
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political order, and the democratization of political decisions (Moltmann 1999, 
44). 
Paradoxically, Christianity asserts its political existence, as part of this new political 
theology, by maintaining a certain critical distance from both society and the state. It 
resists any kind of incorporation into, or alliance with, the state. Rather, its role here 
is to radically dissociate from the state, to condemn its abuses of power and thereby 
contribute towards a democratisation and pluralisation of society. At the same time, 
Christianity should be something more than a privatised belief system that fits in with 
the existing social order without challenging it. The church should be something 
more than simply another private organisation in society. Moltmann refers to the 
Exodus Church, as being in a sense at home nowhere, and thus embodying a critical 
distance from both the state and society (see Paeth 2005, 215-234). The idea that 
religion should be confined to private belief and conscience and kept separate from 
politics was what led to the church’s infamous silence in the face of the crimes of the 
Nazi regime. According to Moltmann (1999, 49) ‘This privatization of religion 
secularised politics’ and opened the way for a new and monstrous political religion to 
emerge. At the same time, Moltmann does not reject secularism as such, but seeks 
to redefine its terms, so that Christianity can enter into an alliance with civil society 
and support secular political causes and struggles for emancipation. Yet, this 
newfound public and political role for the church simply means remaining faithful to 
the core principles of Christianity – those of social justice – defined by the Sermon 
on the Mount (1999, 49-50).11  
In stark contrast to Schmitt’s political religion, which is concerned with shoring up 
political power, Moltmann’s political theology is aimed at the renewal of civil society 
and public life: here churches and religious organisations can play a more prominent, 
yet independent and critical, role in politics by, for instance, aligning themselves with 
progressive and secular social movements and causes. Moltmann believes that the 
Christian church should align itself with struggles for human liberation, whether for 
social and economic justice, anti-racism, anti-colonialism, as well as ecology. Of 
particular interest here is Moltmann’s defence of human rights as providing a 
language for human liberation, one that is international and cosmopolitan rather than 
confined to particular national communities or religious and cultural identities. Insofar 
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as human rights invoke the idea of human dignity, they are genuinely universal. 
Moreover, human rights embody the fundamental principles of liberty and equality. 
According to Moltmann, these ‘liberal’ principles and values were already reflective 
of many religious traditions, particularly Christianity, Judaism and Islam, which 
believe that all humans, both rulers and ruled, are created equally after God’s image. 
And it was this idea of the equal recognition of human dignity which led to the 
humanisation of politics and the emergence of liberal political institutions, such as 
the separation of powers and constitutions designed to limit political authority and 
protect human dignity from violation: ‘The institutions of law, government and 
economy must respect this personal dignity, which is the endowment of all human 
beings, if they claim to be 'humane institutions'.’ (1999, 122-123) This theological 
idea of equal human dignity led to a democratisation of European society and 
produced a new form of political legitimacy based on respect for the equality and 
liberty of all human beings: ‘Any exercise of rule must legitimate itself before other 
human beings.’ (1999, 123) 
At the same time, Moltmann argues that liberalism, in its focus on individual rights, 
neglected questions of economic equality and the social dimension of freedom, 
which could only be realised collectively. Individual human rights and social rights 
must therefore be seen as inextricably linked, each deriving their meaning and 
significance from the other. Moltmann’s political theology of human rights proposes a 
discursive and political interlinking – a kind of ‘intersectionality’ - of different struggles 
and political horizons, which tends towards a genuine universality. He puts it in the 
following way (1999, 121): 
1. No individual human rights without social human rights. 
2. No human rights without the right of humanity to protection from mass 
annihilation and genetic change, and to survival in the sequence of the 
generations. 
3. No economic human rights without ecological obligations towards the rights 
of nature. 
4. No human rights without the right of the earth. 
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This schema of interlocking applications of human rights is aimed at human survival 
and the protection of human dignity. Human beings must be protected not only from 
political domination, but also from nuclear annihilation and genetic manipulation. 
Their economic security must be guaranteed, which means that negative individual 
rights must go hand in hand with positive social and economic rights, such as the 
right to work and the right to an income.  
However, none of these rights are achievable, even conceivable, without an 
accompanying understanding of the rights of nature, of the earth, which impose upon 
us serious obligations for its protection. Moltmann develops an ecological theology of 
creation that rejects an anthropocentric view of the world for a theocentric one: the 
earth is not man’s property but God’s – it is the house of God – and while humans 
have stewardship of the earth, they do not have the sovereign right to exploit it 
irresponsibly and without regard to all its other non-human inhabitants, whose equal 
rights and status must be recognised (see Moltmann 1985). Moreover, this non-
anthropocentric way of thinking also decentres the idea of a sovereign 
anthropomorphic and transcendent God. Rather, God should be seen as immanent 
within nature, as living within his own house and as part of his own creation. The 
emphasis of Moltmann’s eco-theology is on our contingency and our entanglement 
with the earth and with natural ecosystems, upon which our survival depends, to 
which we therefore have obligations, and whose rights we must therefore respect. 
Importantly, it is also a form of political theology which, unlike Schmitt’s, is not 
sovereign-centric, not only because it rejects political monotheism and affirms 
instead a more pluralistic, ‘federal’ model based on rights, democracy and 
constitutional rule, but also because it rejects the anthropomorphic ontology that 
forms the basis of man’s domination of both man and nature. 
What is important, for our purposes, in Moltmann’s version of political or public 
theology is that it works within the framework of liberalism, but at the same time 
transforms and pluralises it. As we have seen, the liberal horizon of individual rights 
is opened up to a broader articulation of social and ecological rights, and to a 
plurality of different struggles against oppression. Moltmann shows, furthermore, that 
political theology – that is an understanding of politics informed by theology – does 
not have to yield the same political conclusions as Schmitt’s sovereign centric 
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political religion. On the contrary, alternative interpretations of Christian political 
theology are more likely to promote a pluralism of human and ecological interests 
and the development of a framework of rights to protect them. Moreover, as we have 
seen, the more prominent role that Moltmann wants to see Christian communities 
play in supporting social struggles and in speaking out against domination in no way 
threatens the idea of the secular public space but, rather, deepens it. Here the 
church takes up the position of the outsider in its political engagement, remaining 
neither a private organisation within existing society, nor aligning itself with the state, 
but retaining a critical distance from both, allowing it to speak out on issues of 
injustice and oppression. 
Conclusion 
Political theology, as a mode of political theorising that investigates the intertwining 
of theology and politics, clearly has ambiguous implications for liberal theory, 
particularly in terms of its response to the post-secular condition and to the question 
of religious pluralism. I have investigated some of these implications, especially the 
issue of the legitimacy of the liberal political order. I have argued that, while Schmitt’s 
political theology forces an encounter with the limits of liberalism, his political 
absolutism and hostility to pluralism make his approach untenable as a framework of 
legitimacy in contemporary post-secular societies. A more compelling approach can 
be found in alternative political theologies that have sought to grasp the full 
consequences of the secular and, in seeking a theological grounding for secular 
movements of emancipation, have contributed towards a deeper pluralisation of the 
political field.  
Here I have explored Moltmann’s radical political theology. In contrast to Schmitt’s 
conservative political theology, which ends up as a sacralisation of the sovereign 
state, Moltmann’s understanding of the church’s political role translates into a 
critique of state power and an adherence to liberal institutions and principles such as 
human rights. At the same time, the incorporation of social struggles and ecological 
concerns into his eco-theologically grounded conception of rights, pluralises the 
terms of the liberal normative framework in which it is otherwise largely situated.  
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The paper started with the question of whether liberalism can be considered a 
political religion, in other words whether its formal commitment to state neutrality, 
toleration, secularism and pluralism is belied by its inextricable structural relationship 
to a theologically grounded concept of sovereignty - as indeed was Schmitt’s claim. 
Moltmann’s alternative rendering of political theology allows us to approach this 
question in an entirely different way. While the relationship between theology and 
politics is affirmed, it is no longer aimed at legitimising political authority but, rather, 
at invigorating a new, autonomous political sphere, one that is neither strictly public 
nor private, neither entirely secular nor religious, but which blurs the lines between 
them and is oriented towards human and environmental emancipation and a critique 
of political power. My argument has been that a more pluralistic form of political 
theology, such as that offered by Moltmann, provides us with a compelling 
framework in which to rethink liberalism’s commitment to rights: by linking human 
rights to social and economic rights, and these to rights of the environment and of 
non-human species, Moltmann not only proposes a theological basis for ecological 
politics, but also expands the discursive parameters of liberal theory in ways that 
might at first seem difficult to accommodate but which, I believe, are necessary if 
liberalism is to remain relevant to contemporary political struggles, including and 
especially those for racial and climate justice.  
It must be acknowledged that Moltmann’s eco-political theology – which he tries to 
make compatible with theo-centrism – is generally at odds not only with most 
anthropocentric and humanistic political traditions, including liberalism, as well as 
with aspects of the Christian tradition itself, which has generally been an 
anthropomorphic religion. Yet the ecological crisis places the experience of the both 
secular and the religious in a new light, revealing the limits of liberal and 
Enlightenment ideas of progress and suggesting the need for a spiritual re-
enchantment of the world. Here I believe that a new theologically-inspired form of 
pluralism, as conveyed in Moltmann’s eco-theological approach, can offer important 
conceptual resources – or at very least the ethical imperative – for precisely this sort 
of project.  
My overall claim, then, is that liberal political theory has nothing to fear from a 
blurring of the line between the religious and the secular – from the politicisation of 
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religious groups and the theologisation of secular politics – as long as this is aligned 
with movements for human and ecological liberation and emerges as part of a 
critique of political power. Indeed, political theology, thought about in these terms, 
can help us make sense of the new movements and modes of political engagement 
that are coming to define post-secular societies. 
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1 There are some recent exceptions here (see Losonczi and Singh 2010; and 
Speight and Zank 2017). 
2 For a sense of this diversity of approaches to political theology see (Cavanaugh 
and Peter Scott 2019; and de Vries and Sullivan 2006) 
3 The importance of a more sustained engagement with theology has been more 
recently recognised by several continental political philosophers, including Giorgio 
Agamben, who seeks to rethink political theology with and against Schmitt. In his 
archaeology of liberal government, Agamben (2012) displaces Schmitt’s 
monotheistic model of sovereignty through the notion of oikonomia, deriving from 
Trinitarian doctrine, tracing this back to early Patristic debates. 
4 See Eric Voegelin on political religions (2000). 
5 Populism can be seen as a form of political theology (see Arato 2013, 143-172). 
6 See Jean L. Cohen’s critique of ‘deep’ jurisdictional pluralists who question the 
liberal state’s right to regulate religious communities (2017, 83-102). 
7 At the same time, Vattimo casts doubt on liberalism’s ability to solve the problems 
of intercultural conflict by consigning religion to the private sphere (see Vattimo 
2002, 94-95). 
8 See Rorty’s more recent engagements with Vattimo on the subject of religion 
(Rorty and Vattimo 2005). 
9 For a useful survey of different approaches in ‘public theology’ see Kim and Day 
(2017). 
10 Here Moltmann’s critique reflects that of other ‘liberation theologians’ around this 
time – such as JB Metz and Dorothee Sölle – of political idolatry, in other words, of 
the sacralisation of political power. Working within a different tradition, Walter 
Benjamin’s notion of ‘divine violence’ might also be seen as a rejection of political 
idolatry (see Martel 2012). 
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11 In his later Political Theology II, Schmitt (2008, 4-15 n. 3) discusses Moltmann’s 
political theology, and essentially agrees with his claim that the Crucifixion had a 
political rather than simply a theological significance. However, Schmitt makes this 
point as part of his broader defence of the idea of political theology against the attack 
by Erik Peterson that there is no sound theological basis for it. 
